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BAD RULES WON’T CLEAN DIRTY POOLS: THE PROBLEM
BEHIND SECTION 523(A)(16) POLICY AND THE
UNNECESSARY BURDEN IT PLACES ON DEBTOR HOA
MEMBERS
Austin D. Murray*
“The purpose of [the Bankruptcy Code] has been again and
again emphasized . . . it gives to the honest but unfortunate
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he
owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and
a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”†
–Justice Sutherland
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INTRODUCTION
Although debtors generally seek bankruptcy to obtain a fresh start
through the discharge of their pre-petition debts in exchange for their current
assets or a portion of their future earnings, Congress has carved out multiple
exceptions to this discharge for public policy reasons.1 Some exceptions to
discharge are due to the debtor’s violation of some behavioral standard specified in the Bankruptcy Code.2 Other exceptions, such as section 523(a)(16),
which is the focus of this Comment, are based solely on the nature of the debt
and avoiding potentially harsh repercussions of non-payment to the creditor.
Section 523(a)(16) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge all
post-petition fees or assessments with respect to the debtor’s interest in a unit
that has condominium ownership, in a share of a cooperative corporations, or
a lot in a homeowner’s association (collectively “HOAs”) for as long as the
debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest
in such a unit.3 Although only pre-petition debts are typically dischargeable,
HOA fees and assessments present a unique situation where a post-petition
debt is the result of a pre-petition agreement between the HOA and the homeowner. Such debts may continue to accrue for months, even years, after the
debtor has gone through the bankruptcy proceeding and yearns for a much
needed fresh start.4 At its inception, section 523(a)(16) excepted from discharge only post-petition HOA fees and assessments while the debtor continued to live on the property or rented out the property.5 However, in amending
this section in 2005, Congress has significantly increased the burden on the
1 Cara
O’Neill, Nondischargeable Debts in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/nondischargeable-debts-chapter-7-bankruptcy.html (last visited January 20, 2017) (The Bankruptcy Code lists 19 categories of nondischargeable debt. These are debts
Congress has determined not dischargeable for public policy reasons based on the nature of the debt or
the fact that the debts were incurred due to improper behavior.).
2

Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy, HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985).

3

See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2017).

4

See Amy Loftsgordon, States With Long Foreclosure Timelines, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/states-with-long-foreclosure-timelines.html [hereinafter Loftsgordon, Foreclosure
Timelines] (last visited January 20, 2017).
5

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1994).
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debtor to continue paying the fees for as long as the debtor has legal, equitable, or possessory ownership.6 Unfortunately for the debtor-member, it is not
so easy to shed ownership, especially when the mortgagee is unwilling to
foreclose.7 However, the 2005 amendment was a victory for HOAs and housing communities who found Congress receptive to their appeals to expand
the 1994 exception to discharge.8
However, this has not silenced the controversy that has surrounded section 523(a)(16) even from its inception in 1994. For instance, the original
provision itself was lobbied against by the National Association of Consumer
Bankruptcy Attorneys (“NACBA”), who strongly disapproved of Congress
expanding the scope of nondischargeable debts beyond wrongful conduct by
the debtor or protection of important governmental interests.9 But even this
departure from historic bankruptcy law was not enough to satisfy HOA creditors who believed they were entitled to more protection. The main arguments
behind this belief were that post-petition assessments are not a claim covered
by section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code and that HOA fees are a covenant
that runs with the land rather than a contractual agreement;10 this is all to say
that HOA fees and assessments are per se nondischargeable.
Congress has never expressed whether it agrees with either of those arguments, just that it believed HOAs were entitled to more protection as a
matter of policy.11 Congress certainly considered the importance of HOAs in
maintaining the property values within such associations. When HOAs do
not receive payment from their homeowners, there is a direct impact on the
level of upkeep and maintenance an HOA can afford to put into the common
areas that all residents enjoy and that property values are largely based on.
More importantly, paying homeowners might be forced to shoulder the loss
by either picking up the slack or simply dealing with deteriorating property
values while they live in a less desirable community.12

6

11 U.S.C.A § 523(a)(16) (West 2005).

7

Jeffery S. Adams, Rewriting 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(16): The Problems of Delayed Foreclosure and
Judicial Activism, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 347, 349 (2014) (“‘With the real estate collapse, lenders,
who otherwise have the right to do so, are choosing not to foreclose on their collateral[,] leaving homeowners in limbo.’”) (quoting In re Pigg, 453 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011)).
8 See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733 (describing § 523(a)(16)’s expanded coverage as “the result of
some special interest lobbying . . . .”).
9 Veryl Victoria Miles, Fairness, Responsibility, and Efficiency in the Bankruptcy Discharge: Are
the Commission’s Recommendations Enough?, 102 DICK. L. REV. 795, 804 (1998).
10 Alfred Q. Ricotta, Community Associations and Bankruptcy: Why Postpetition Assessments
Should not be Dischargeable, 15 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 187, 210 (1998).
11 See 140 CONG. REC. S4526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (noting that association members “may be unfairly burdened by increases in their association fees if their
neighbors declare bankruptcy and receive a discharge of the association fees which are due in the future”).
12

See id.
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As strong as this policy may be, when one considers the position of the
debtor homeowners who surrendered their assets in bankruptcy and are not
living on the property or benefitting from it in any way, it is essential to consider if there are alternative mechanisms for protecting the parties involved.
Presently, debtor homeowners are not only burdened by post-petition HOA
fees and assessments, but are also at the mercy of their lenders who can delay
sale of the home for as long as they please.13 Therefore, this Comment urges
Congress to rethink the necessity of excepting from discharge post-petition
HOA fees and assessments when the debtor-member is not living on or benefiting from the property.
Currently, the Bankruptcy Code treats a debtor’s right to a fresh start
and an HOAs’ right to payment as competing interests where one must suffer
to protect the other. With the 2005 amendment to section 523(a)(16) Congress tipped the scales in HOAs’ favor by keeping the debtor on the hook for
HOA fees and assessments until the debtor no longer has any legal, equitable,
and possessory interests in the property.14
This Comment asserts that Congress overlooked a few important considerations in concluding that the only way to protect HOAs was to have the
debtor bear the entire burden. Not only is this an unrealistic way to protect
the HOAs’ interests, considering the debtor’s insolvency,15 but it is also an
unnecessary deviation from bankruptcy law’s “fresh start” policy.16 The considerations that Congress overlooked are: (1) the bank has a pecuniary incentive in maintaining the property;17 (2) state laws allow banks to delay foreclosure indefinitely;18 and (3) accruing HOA fees against the debtor
unintentionally benefits the bank and does not incentivize it to take action.19
With these considerations in mind, Congress should recognize the
mechanisms available to HOAs to mitigate the impact of an HOA member’s
bankruptcy proceeding, such as lien foreclosure and rent collection. This
would result in a more equitable outcome than having the debtor-member
shoulder the entire burden of the accumulating obligation. For example, if
Congress were to discharge post-petition HOA assessments when the debtor
13 Brandt H. Stitzer, HOA Fees: A BAPCPA Death-Trap, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1419
(2013); see also Adams, supra note 7, at 357 (stating “the liability could theoretically continue ‘in perpetuity.’”).
14

11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2005).

15

Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1426 (stating that “lack of member equity has rendered § 523(a)(16)
of little value to associations.”).
16

Id.

17

See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. 728, 732 n.5 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011).

18

Christopher W. Frost, Zombie Titles and Bankruptcy: In re Canning, 33 No. 6 BANKR. L.
LETTER 1, 1 (2013) (stating that mortgagees may decide that the risks and costs of foreclosure are not
worth the effort).
19

See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 732 n.5.
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is not living on the property, HOAs could promptly foreclose on their assessment lien and collect rent on the property until the bank forecloses or possibly
redeems the property by paying off the assessment lien. This would result in
the HOA receiving payment for its fees and assessments without unduly burdening the debtor-member or the mortgage lender.
Because Congress has not taken an express position as to whether postpetition HOA fees and assessments are a dischargeable claim under section
101(5), courts are still struggling with how to treat the debt.20 For example,
courts addressing chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, which require looking toward
section 1328(b) rather than section 523 to determine which debts are nondishcargeable, are torn as to the dischargeability of post-petition HOA assessments, which are not expressly excepted from discharge within section
1328(b).21 Therefore, there are important reasons for Congress to confirm or
deny that section 523(a)(16) is essential to excepting HOA assessments from
discharge in the typical chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. In other words, Congress
should take an express stance on whether post-petition HOA fees and assessments are considered a claim under the Bankruptcy Code. With that said, this
Comment will proceed by addressing Congress’ implicit view of section
523(a)(16), its purpose, and whether, contrary to popular arguments, postpetition HOA fees and assessments meet the Bankruptcy Code’s definition
of a claim under section 101(5).22
Section I begins with an historical overview, which describes the dissonant judicial backdrop that lead to the introduction of the first version of section 523(a)(16) in 1994. The Background section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A explores the possible and likely influences that guided
Congress to its eventual 2005 amendment, which drastically changed who
the section 523(a)(16) exception to discharge applies to. Subsection B then
explains the impact that 2008’s financial crisis had on the real estate market
and subsequently on the length of the foreclosure process, and how this has
levied a significant burden on debtor homeowners who are considered to
20 See In re Hall, 454 B.R. 230, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (“It is just as likely that Congress was
implying that post-petition assessments are not really claims at all, and that the amendment was necessary
to correct the mischaracterization of post-petition assessments as claims.”); see also In re Spencer, 457
B.R. 601 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (holding that a debtor’s obligation for condominium assessments on unit that
he continued to own postpetition, even after announcing his intent to surrender unit, was obligation which
ran with the land and which debtor could not discharge as personal prepetition obligation of debtor). But
see In re Hawk, 314 B.R. 312, 316-17 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (“By defining the parameters of when postpetition fees and assessments can and cannot [be] discharged, Congress was implicitly stating that these
future assessments are claims.”).
21 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West 2005) (defining the scope of Chapter 13 discharge, but declining to incorporate § 523(a)(16)); see also In re Hawk, 314 B.R. at 316–17. But see In re Foster, 435 B.R.
650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (doubting that “the omission of § 1328(a) in § 523(a)(16) or vice versa
evinces a legislative intent” that assessments be dischargeable under § 1328(a)).
22

11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West 2017).
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have legal ownership of their property until title completely transfers. Subsection C then explains why the courts’ hands are tied to provide relief to
these unfortunate debtors and why congressional action is necessary.
Section II then engages in analysis beginning with subsection A, which
addresses whether post-petition HOA fees and assessments should be considered a “claim” under section 101(5) the Bankruptcy Code, as this will determine whether these assessments are dischargeable in the first place. After
establishing that post-petition assessments should be considered a claim, subsection B explores how section 523(a)(16) is currently ineffective as to serving its intended purpose of protecting HOAs. This transitions into subsection
C which sets forth a number of mechanisms that an HOA could utilize, provided with consistent legislative support, to better protect itself in the event
its property owner(s) are not paying the HOA’s assessments.
Ultimately, this Comment proposes an amendment to section 523(a)(16)
which seeks to, (1) reinstate the dischargeability of post-petition assessments
for homeowners who do not possess the property or collect rents on it, (2)
retract unfruitful creditor protection from a bankruptcy code intended to provide a fresh start, and (3) better incentivize lenders to contribute to property
maintenance costs when they plan to delay foreclosure.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. History of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(16)

Added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1994, Congress enacted section
523(a)(16) to “resolve the split of authority . . . regarding the dischargeability
of post-petition assessments.”23 The split consisted of three main lines of authority: (1) post-petition assessments were not dischargeable because they are
post-petition obligations that arise from a covenant that runs with ownership
of the land,24 (2) post-petition assessments were dischargeable as part of a
prepetition contract,25 and (3) that post-petition assessments were

23

Adams, supra note 7, at 347.

24

In re Rosenfeld, 23 F.3d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Under the Declaration, the obligation to pay
assessments is a function of owning the land with which the covenant runs. Thus, Rosenfeld’s obligation
to pay the assessments arose from his continued post-petition ownership of the property and not from a
pre-petition contractual obligation.”).
23

In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1990) (“It is true that the Rostecks did not actually owe money
to Old Willow for assessments beyond those Old Willow had assessed before their bankruptcy. But the
condominium declaration is a contract, and by entering that contract the Rostecks agreed to pay Old Willow any assessments it might levy.”).
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dischargeable only if the debtor does not reside in or lease the unit.26 Appearing to have adopted the third line of reasoning but not necessarily ruling out
the second, the 1994 version of the Section read:
(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable
after the order for relief to a membership association with
respect to the debtor’s interest in a dwelling unit that has
condominium ownership or in a share of a cooperative housing corporation, but only if such fee or assessment is payable
for a period during which—
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the
condominium or cooperative project; or
(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and
received payments from the tenant for such period, but
nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the
debt of a debtor for a membership association fee or
pending or subsequent bankruptcy case.27
Senator Strom Thurmon shed light on what Congress sought to protect
by stating that association members “may be unfairly burdened by increases
in their association fees if their neighbors declare bankruptcy and receive a
discharge of the association fees which are due in the future.”28 However, it
is evident that Congress intended to enforce these fees only against freeriding
members who continued to live on their property and receive all the benefits
of ownership without paying their fair share of association fees. This is evidenced by the fact that assessments were still dischargeable against the debtors who no longer resided on the property or received rent from it.29 This
supports the belief that Congress did not intend to address whether HOA fees
and assessments are a dischargeable post-petition debt, but rather implemented this Section purely as a matter of public policy.30
However, HOAs were discontent with the scope of section 523(a)(16).
For one, the 1994 version only afforded protection from the freeriding members of condominiums and cooperatives but omitted homeowner associations. Furthermore, HOAs did not agree with the “you stay, you pay”31 policy
26 In re Ryan, 100 B.R. 411, 416 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[F]or the post-petition assessments to
be discharged, the debtor must . . . relinquish possession and other incidents of ownership of the unit in
clear and unequivocal terms.”).
27

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1994).

28

140 CONG. REC. S4526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (noting
that association members “may be unfairly burdened by increases in their association fees if their neighbors declare bankruptcy and receive a discharge of the association fees which are due in the future.”).
29

Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1399.

30

Id. at 1413.

31

Id. at 1415.
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because it offered no mitigation of harm to associations whose members
simply vacated without transferring ownership.32
Enter the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 (“BAPCA”). BAPCA, and its amendments to the prior Code, was an
initiative to offer more preference to, and protection for, creditors.33 In regard
to section 523(a)(16), Congress added homeowner associations to the list of
creditors and excepted from discharge all post-petition HOA assessments and
fees regardless of whether the debtor occupies the property. This much
broader exception reads as follows:
[F]or a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable after
the order for relief to a membership association with respect
to the debtor’s interest in a unit that has condominium ownership, in a share of a cooperative corporation, or a lot in a
homeowners association, for as long as the debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest
in such unit, such corporation, or such lot, but nothing in this
paragraph shall except from discharge the debt of a debtor
for a membership association fee or assessment for a period
arising before entry of the order for relief in a pending or
subsequent bankruptcy case.34
Essentially, the concern underlying the 2005 amendment was the gap
between abandonment of the property by the debtor and the time when the
lender or HOA retakes the premises. However, Congress did not foresee
lenders delaying foreclosure for an extended length of time. For this reason,
the current section 523(a)(16) has come to be known as a “death-trap” for
honest debtors seeking a fresh start.35 Critics have criticized the faulty assumptions on which the amendment rests, like “vacating debtors [can] easily
divest themselves of ownership and escape nondischargeable accruing assessments.”36 Although some courts conclude that section 523(a)(16)’s language finally “preempts any argument that postpetition fees and assessments
should be considered prepetition obligations,”37 the fact that Congress enacted the amendment to serve policy goals without affirming these assertions
certainly leaves this question open for debate.
32

Id. at 1417.

33

See Donald Hackney, Matthew McPherson, & Daniel Friesner, Investigating the Unintended

Consequences of the 2005 BAPCPA “Means Test” on the Bankruptcy Chapter Choice Decision, 4 J.
ECON. BANKING & FIN. 1, 2 (2011) (“BAPCPA provides a thorough overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code,
generally rendering the Code more creditor-friendly.”).
34

11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2005) (emphasis added).

35

Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1418.

36

Id. at 1418–19.

37

In re Ames, 447 B.R. 680, 682 n.3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011).
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B. The Reality Facing Vacating Homeowners and the HOAs Left
Behind
A few years after the BAPCA amendment to section 523(a)(16), the
United States was hit by the 2007-08 real estate market crash. In the wake of
the crash, property values slumped so low that lenders frequently decided,
“the risk and costs of foreclosures are not worth the effort.”38 This has lead
lenders to categorically deny short sale, auction, and foreclosure requests.39
It has also lead to lenders initiating the foreclosure process but not following
through, leaving the debtor, the vacated property, and the surrounding community in a state of limbo.40 This problem is particularly prevalent in economically distressed areas. A 2010 Government Accountability Office report
noted that abandoned foreclosures were concentrated in such areas and “significantly affected those communities by contributing to crime and by depressing the value of the surrounding properties.”41
Almost a decade later, the repercussions of this economic catastrophe
are still felt. Before the mortgage crisis, home prices had steadily increased
for fifteen years.42 In retrospect, it is understandable why Congress amended
the section under the assumption that banks would likely choose to foreclose,
even if at a small loss, rather than allow the property to sit vacant without
bringing in any money. However, due to the staggering plummet in the real
estate market, lenders are far more likely to delay the sale of foreclosed property. After all this time, the foreclosure delaying effects of the 2007-08 crash
are not only lingering but are on the rise.43
Even though data shows that the number of foreclosures is going down,
in many states the time it takes to foreclose is increasing.44 In the first quarter
of 2012 the national foreclosure timeline averaged 370 days, but in the third
quarter of 2015 this average had risen to 629 days.45 In fact, the foreclosure
process has increased year-over-year in twenty-eight states.46 According to
RealtyTrac (an online marketplace for foreclosure properties and real estate
data) the following states are infamously ranked as those with the longest

38

Frost, supra note 18, at 1.

39

See Better Bankruptcy, SFGATE, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/would-lender-deny-short-salewant-foreclosure-instead-7252.html (last visited March 24, 2017).
40

Frost, supra note 18, at 1.

41

Id.

42

Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1419.

43

Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timelines, supra note 4.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Repeat Foreclosure Crisis Starting to Surface?, REALTOR MAGAZINE (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://magazine.realtor/daily-news/2015/11/04/repeat-foreclosure-crisis-starting-surface.
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foreclosure process: New Jersey (as of the second quarter of 2017, the average foreclosure time in New Jersey is 1,347 days), New York (had the thirdlongest foreclosure timeline, averaging 1,255 days), while Florida foreclosures take around 1,203 days to complete.
With HOA fees typically above $200, this could mean a $6,000 liability,
or more, against a person—or family—with so little to spare.47 If Congress
had known this would have been the case in 2005, it is not very likely it would
have given as much favor to the creditors as it did. This is simply an example
of legislation being rationalized upon an assumption that has been proven
wrong. Congress likely did not have this scenario in mind three years earlier
when it only hoped to better protect creditor rights. In fairness to Congress,
Brandt Stitzer did state:
Section 523(a)(16) was likely amended under the assumption that lenders would continue to promptly foreclose on
surrendered properties as they had done in the past, or that
debtors would continue to have alternative ways to divest
themselves of property. The combination of the mortgage
crisis and the inability for debtors to divest themselves of
their property has proven this assumption defective.48
Today, the reality is that transferring ownership is not a fast and easy
process, and the debtor has absolutely no control over the timeline. Indeed,
there were other factors lengthening the timeline apart from a lender’s decision to wait out increased property values, such as the increase of foreclosures that jammed the usual flow of the foreclosure process.49 However, the
fact that the number of foreclosures is now decreasing, while the time it takes
to foreclose is increasing, indicates that lender-delays are currently prolonging the foreclosure process. All the while the debtor is liable for the accruing
monthly expenses of maintaining the property. The effects of the lender’s
leverage and the lack of incentive for the lender to expedite the foreclosure
process is harming the debtor. Moreover, the HOA and HOA community are
also harmed by these effects as the HOA is better able to recover its assessments and maintain its community when there is a solvent homeowner living
on the property rather than an insolvent debtor who has abandoned the property.50

47

Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timelines, supra note 4.

48

Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1419.

49

In re Spencer, 457 B.R. 601, 612 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (“The confluence of economic forces has
flooded the market [with foreclosures] and jammed the usual flow of the foreclosure process, with upstream effects on bankruptcy proceedings.”).
50 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1426 (“The combination of lender delay and lack of member equity
has, however, rendered § 523(a)(16) of little value to associations.”).
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State laws regarding transfer of ownership also place the debtor at a disadvantage. Under the law of many states, perfect title to real estate cannot be
abandoned.51 This means that while the property is unoccupied the title owner
is assumed to continue in possession.52 Even in a “title theory” state, where
the mortgagee holds the borrower’s title to the property as security until all
loan payments have been made, the borrower will always be the equitable
owner.53 Therefore, the obligation to pay HOA fees and assessments would
not shift to the mortgagee unless the mortgagee were to take possession.54
C. The Bankruptcy Courts’ Inability to Provide Equitable Relief
So far, the only burdens on the debtor that have been discussed are those
that state law imposes. These burdens include permitting mortgagees to delay
foreclosure and establishing the debtor as the equitable owner of property
they have abandoned even if their lender holds title. However, in addition to
these burdens there are little—if any—resources a debtor can turn to for relief. Courtrooms around the nation are at a loss to provide any legally permissible assistance to debtors who find themselves paying HOA fees month
after month to benefit a property they have completely disassociated themselves from.55
First of all, after the First Circuit’s decision in In re Canning, it is unlikely that a debtor could successfully claim that a mortgagee’s refusal to
foreclose or claim possession of the property violates the bankruptcy code’s
discharge injunction. The discharge injunction, set out in section 524 of the
Bankruptcy Code, “operates as an injunction against . . . an act to collect,
recover or offset any such [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the
debtor.”56 In Canning, the debtor filed under Chapter 7 and received a discharge of the remainder of its mortgage.57 The debtor requested that the bank
foreclose on the property or otherwise take title to the residence since the

51 Frost, supra note 18, at 4; see, e.g., Town of Sedgwick v. Butler, 722 A.2d 357, 358 (Me.
1998) (“perfect legal title cannot be lost by abandonment . . . .”).
52

Frost, supra note 18, at 4.

53

Id. at 4–5.

54

Id. at 5.

55

See In re Beeter, 173 B.R. 108, 113 n. 4 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that factors such as abandonment are not relevant to determining whether post-petition assessments are a dischargeable claim); see
also In re Courmier, 434 B.R. 222, 224 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (“At a time when the soaring foreclosure
rate has left a backlog of bank-owned properties, and both owners and banks often choose to simply walk
away—leaving abandoned homes and buildings to blight and burden their neighborhoods, cities, and
towns—the inadequacy of existing state and federal laws to provide meaningful, responsible solutions
becomes distressingly obvious. Yet, judges are interpreters and not architects of the law.”).
56

11 U.S.C.A. § 524(2) (West 2005).

57

In re Canning, 706 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2013).
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debtor was still obligated to pay taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses
for the property.58 When the bank refused the debtor’s request, the debtor
filed for a adversary proceeding claiming that the bank was in violation of
the discharge injunction and sought an order requiring the bank to either take
possession of the property or to deliver unencumbered title to the debtors.59
The plaintiff’s theory was that the bank was attempting to extract payment of a discharged debt (i.e., the remaining mortgage) by using the debtor’s
liability as an “equitable owner” as leverage. 60 In support of this theory the
plaintiff relied primarily on In re Pratt.61 In Pratt, the same court held that a
secured creditor’s posture in conditioning release of its lien on full payment
of the loan balance amounted to a reaffirmation of debt demand that contravened “the stringent ‘anti-coercion’ requirements of [the] Bankruptcy Code
. . . .”62
However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted key distinctions between the facts of Canning and Pratt. First, the court noted the difference in
the secured creditors’ postures. In Pratt, the secured creditor refused to repossess and conditioned release of its lien upon full payment of the loan balance.63 The creditor rested its refusal on its state-law in rem right to enforce
its lien against the vehicle even after discharge of Pratt’s unsecured liability
on the loan.64 However, the court reasoned that state law rights are not a defense to violating the discharge injunction if the rights are being asserted to
coerce payment of a discharged debt.65 By contrast, in Canning, the secured
creditor did not require the debtor to pay in full, but rather offered the opportunity for a voluntary settlement or a short sale.66 This indicated to the court
that the bank had no interest in coercing full payment of the discharged debt
and sought to collect no more than the value securing its lien.67
Secondly, the court marked the differences in the collateral that the debtors sought to relinquish in the two cases. In Pratt, the property at issue was a
car.68 This was a critical component of the Pratt holding because unlike real
estate, “vehicles rarely appreciate over time.”69 According to the Bankruptcy
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Id. at 67.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 72.
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Id. at 67–68.

62

In re Pratt, 462 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2006).
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Id. at 15.
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Id. at 16.

65

Id. at 19.
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In re Canning, 706 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2013).
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Id. at 68.
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In re Pratt, 462 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2006).

69

Id. at 20.
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Appellate Panel in Canning as well as the First Circuit Court of Appeals, real
estate’s ability to increase in value over time provides a compelling reason
for creditors to insist on their state law right to retain liens and refuse repossession.70 This was not the outcome in Pratt because the car was deemed
worthless and the creditor was demanding to be paid in full.71
It is unclear if the result in Canning would have been different if the
mortgagee had not provided the options of negotiation or short sale to the
debtor. However, it is entirely possible that real estate’s ability to appreciate
in value alone is sufficient to establish that any refusal by a lender to deliver
unencumbered title is free of any coercion that would be deemed to violate
the discharge injunction. This means that a debtor HOA member who wishes
to require its lender to foreclose on the debtor’s property in order to relieve
the debtor of accruing assessments will not likely have an action against the
refusing lender for violation of the discharge injunction.
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code itself, despite its fresh start policy,
does not offer any clear recourse for a debtor affected by section 523(a)(16).
Although debtors have the option under sections 521 and 1325 of the Code
to “surrender” their property,72 judicial interpretation of these provisions hold
that a debtor who surrenders is simply agreeing to make the collateral available to the secured creditor and will not oppose transfer of the collateral.73
However, in no way does surrendering the property require the creditor to
take possession or foreclose on the property.74 Moreover, courts do not have
the authority to compel acceptance of the surrendered property.75 Although
many courts have expressed disapproval with the debtor being subject to the
lender’s will and having no mechanism to avoid accumulating assessments
attached to an encumbered property,76 courts must act as “interpreters and not
architects of the law.” 77
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In re Canning, 706 F.3d at 72.
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In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 20.
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See 11 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West 2017); see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West 2017).
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In re Spencer, 457 B.R. 601, 612 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
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In re Service, 155 B.R. 512, 514 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (“Debtors may not compel this creditor to
accept surrender nor enforce its rights and take title to the realty.”).
75

Id.

76

See In re Beeter, 173 B.R. 108, 113 n. 4 (W.D. Tex. 1994); see also In re Courmier, 434 B.R.
222, 224 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).
77

In re Courmier, 434 B.R. at 224.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Post-petition Assessments are a “Claim” under Section 101(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code section 101(5) defines a “claim” as:
A right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
A right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not
such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.78
Initially, some have argued that post-petition HOA fees and assessments
are not prepetition claims within the Code definition of “claim,” and therefore, regardless of section 523(a)(16), a debtor cannot discharge such obligations in bankruptcy.79 Therefore, the analysis begins with first establishing
that post-petition assessments do in fact fit into the Code’s definition of
“claim” or, at least, that this is what Congress intended.
The primary argument that HOA assessments are not within the Code’s
meaning of “claim” is that an HOA’s right to performance is based on a nondischargeable equitable servitude rather than a contingent right to payment.80
In other words, the obligation to pay assessments do not arise from a prepetition contract, but from a covenant running with the land.81 This means that
the debtor’s obligation to the HOA arises from a property interest given by
each party, which lasts until legal title is transferred.82 The effect of this is
that discharging debt tied to property rights would invest a greater property
interest in the debtor than it had prior to filing for bankruptcy, which is not
the Code’s goal.83 As one author observes, “The distinction between secured
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11 U.S.C.A. 101(5) (West 2017).

79

Ricotta, supra note 10.
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Id. at 195.
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Id. at 188.
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Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1409.
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See Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The simple expedient of passing
their residence through the bankruptcy estate could not vest in the [debtors] a greater interest in the residence than they enjoyed prior to filing . . . .”) (citing In re Honaker, 4 B.R. 415, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1980)).
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claims against debtors’ real property and claims against debtors individually,
and the ability to separate them, is crucial to this theory.”84
The Supreme Court weighed in on this distinction in Johnson v. Home
State Bank. This case sets forth the question of whether a debtor, who filed
for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, could be discharged
from his mortgage liability.85 The Court held that a mortgage lien securing
an obligation is a “claim” within the meaning of section 101(5) since Congress intended section 101(5) to incorporate the broadest definition of
“claim.”86 Furthermore, the Court stated that “right to payment” means
“nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation.”87
Notably, the Supreme Court defines a mortgage as an interest in real
property that secures creditor’s right to payment.88 However, the Court did
not hold that the complete property right is discharged, just the debtor’s obligation under it.89 As the Court noted, this leaves the creditor with a surviving right to retain proceeds from the sale or foreclosure of the debtor’s property.90 The Court states, “[t]hus, a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only
one mode of enforcing a claim—an in personam action—while leaving intact
another—an in rem action.”91 Although this would appear to support the notion that personal rights and property rights arising from HOA assessment
obligations are similarly severable, there is still a key distinction between a
mortgage and HOA assessments. If an HOA assessment is in fact a covenant
that runs with the land, the assessment would be an integral part of the property which became a personal liability when the debtor acquired title to the
property. This differs from the in personam liability on a mortgage which is
acquired by a debtor as a matter of contract.92
Perhaps more indicative of Congress’ view on the issue is what Congress believed at the time it made post-petition HOA assessments nondischargeable. Based on congressional commentary and the language of the statute itself, it seems unlikely that Congress takes the stance that assessments
accruing after discharge are not otherwise dischargeable. As noted above,
Congress indicated that it sought to protect associations from the burden of
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Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1408.
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Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
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Id. at 83.
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Id. at 78.
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Id. at 82.
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Id. at 78.
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Id.

91

Id.
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In re Rivera, 256 B.R. 828, 833-34 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000); see also In re Hall, 454 B.R. 230,
241 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (distinguishing a covenant to pay assessments from a mortgage).
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assessment default.93 Thus, even in light of the then prevailing argument that
these obligations were an integral property right that could not be discharged,
Congress focused on the policy reasons for justifying the 2005 amendment
and completely ignored the proposition that HOA assessments are covenants
that run with the land. This suggests that Congress has considered post-petition HOA assessments to be a right to payment covered by the Code’s definition of “claim” all along and that section 523(a)(16) was necessary for Congress to protect HOAs from the discharge of this post-petition debt.
Furthermore, the fact that an HOA assessment may be a covenant running with the land is not dispositive as to whether it creates a right to payment
dischargeable under section 101(5). Even if an HOA’s right to payment is
based on an equitable servitude, it is still may be “a right to payment” contemplated by Congress when it drafted the definition of claim under the Code.
The legislative history of section 101(5) indicates that Congress intended “to
provide the broadest possible definition of claim.”94 Furthermore, Congress
contemplated that “all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote
or contingent will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.”95
Even without this piece of legislative history, the language itself is clear
that Congress contemplated equitable rights to payment to be dischargeable.
Again, claim is defined as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is
. . . equitable; or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives right to payment.”96 Nonetheless, critics press forward that
HOA fees are not a right to payment, but rather a property interest, based on
the equitable servitude theory.97 The idea here is that because the debtor’s in
personam right cannot be separated from the creditor’s in rem right without
vesting the debtor with a greater property interest, equitable servitudes are
per se nondischargeable. However, there is an argument to be made that when
an HOA’s only interest is in receiving monetary payment then the debtor’s
obligation to pay that debt is dischargeable.98 First, consider the following
assertion:
There are several misconceptions about discharging HOA
dues that are common among both homeowners and

93 140 CONG. REC. S4526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (noting
that association members “may be unfairly burdened by increases in their association fees if their neighbors declare bankruptcy and receive a discharge of the association fees which are due in the future.”).
94

Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991).

95

S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 22 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5808; see also H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 309 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266.
96

11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West 2017).
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Ricotta, supra note 10.
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See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (holding that the bankruptcy code does not require a
claim to arise from a contractual arrangement).
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attorneys. It is commonly thought that HOA dues run with
land, and are not dischargeable in bankruptcy . . . These misunderstandings can be resolved when it is understood that
the assessments are not the same thing as the covenants. The
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) contain a
covenant that is a promise to pay the assessments each month
they become due. This covenant to pay the assessments is a
separate and distinct thing from the actual assessment, which
is the dollar amount of fees imposed each month. The covenant in the CC&Rs runs with the land and can never be removed, but the assessments are regular debts that can be discharged in bankruptcy under a certain set of rules. The truth
is that past due HOA arrears are dischargeable in most
cases.99
Secondly, in Ohio v. Kovacs, the Supreme Court made clear that the
bankruptcy code does not require a claim to arise out of a contractual agreement.100 In that case, the debtor’s obligation arose from a statutory violation,
which lead to a court order requiring the debtor to perform environmental
cleanup.101 However, the Court found that Ohio indicated that it was only
interested in “a money payment to effectuate . . . cleanup.”102 Because the
liability was based on a monetary payment, the Court ruled that the right to
payment was dischargeable in bankruptcy.103 Based on this ruling, it would
seem that liability based on a right to monetary payment—even if it arises
from a property interest—should be considered a claim in bankruptcy.
This ruling is distinguishable from lower court rulings, which state that
just because a debtor has to spend money to comply with a court order does
not necessarily create a dischargeable claim.104 For example, in Hubler, a
district court case affirmed by the Third Circuit, the court addressed the issue
of whether an equitable order requiring a party to engage in affirmative acts
to clean up the environment gives rise to a “right to payment” that can be
considered a claim under the Bankruptcy Code.105 The district court’s interpretation of Kovacs was that its holding is limited to situations where a

99 Andrew Christensen, Can I Discharge My Home Owner Association Dues in Bankruptcy?,
CLINE LAW GRP., https://www.clinelawgroup.com/debts/can-i-discharge-my-home-owner-associationdues-in-bankruptcy/.
100

Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 275.

101

Id. at 276.

102

Id. at 281.
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Id. at 274.
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See United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160 (W.D. Penn. 1990), aff’d, 928 F.2d 1131 (3rd Cir.

1991).
105

Id. at 163.
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cleanup order is “converted into an obligation to pay money.”106 This led the
court to hold that equitable court orders, which demand performance and
which cannot be satisfied by making a monetary payment, are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.107
The Hubler holding does not affect the issue at hand. When it comes to
HOA fees and assessments, the sole interest is in monetary payment. Unlike
an obligation to perform a task, which may require the ancillary spending of
money, HOA assessments create an immediate right to payment where monetary payment is the only way to satisfy the obligation. Therefore, the possibility that an HOA’s right to receive payment of its assessment and fees may
be based in a property interest is less significant. It is the HOA’s “right to
payment” that creates a claim under the Bankruptcy Code, not where the right
comes from.108 This Comment does not overlook the fact that violating a statute, as was the case in Kovacs, does not implicate the same rights as violating
a covenant running with the land. However, the overarching opinion of this
section is that the actual monetary assessment charged against the debtor is
separate from the debtor’s promise to pay the assessment each month it becomes due.109
Finally, the language of section 523(a)(16) makes clear that Congress
views HOA assessments as a “debt.” In pertinent part section 523(a)(16)
states: “[B]ut nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the debt
of a debtor for a membership association fee or assessment for a period arising before entry of the order for relief in a pending or subsequent bankruptcy
case.” 110 This is significant because the Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as
“liability on a claim,”111 within the same section of the Code where Congress
defines claim. Accordingly, the debt described in section 523(a)(16) is a
claim by definition.
Therefore, because (1) the actual assessments are a regular debt that creates a “right to payment”; (2) Congress intended the scope of section 101(5)
to be read as broadly as possible; (3) prepetition HOA assessments are dischargeable; and (4) Congress describes HOA assessments as a debt, which
by definition makes the assessment a liability based on a claim, it is evident
that Congress would recognize that HOA assessments are not a nondischargeable claim in the absence of section 523(a)(16). Thus, the only roadblock to the dischargeability of HOA assessments is section 523(a)(16) itself.
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B. Bad Rules Don’t Clean Dirty Pools: Why Section 523(a)(16) Does
Not Actually Protect HOAs
Because Congress amended section 523(a)(16) in order to protect HOAs
rather than to declare HOA assessments per se nondischargeable, it must now
be considered whether section 523(a)(16) actually serves its intended purpose. If Congress assumed that the debtor would be able to resort to self-help
strategies to pay off the accumulating assessments, it was wrong. As discussed, courts cannot force lender foreclosure and debtors cannot assert violation of the discharge injunction against lenders.112 Therefore, an insolvent
debtor may have significant difficulty coming up with the means to pay the
accruing assessments for an extended period.
A similarly erroneous assumption is that debtors will actually make
good on their HOA fees and assessments simply because they are deemed
nondischargeable. This is not to say that exceptions to discharge are inherently worthless. However, section 523(a)(16) does present an atypical debt
scenario. Unlike many of the prepetition debts excepted from discharge
throughout section 523, whether it be for recovery of priority payments or
the debtor’s bad behavior, section 523(a)(16) refers to an accumulating postpetition debt.113 This means that each month will carry with it a new debt
balance arising from an interest in property that the debtor-owner does not
presently possess. It is not difficult to see why in most cases it is not likely
that the insolvent debtor will have the ability or will to pay off each monthly
balance pertaining to the abandoned property.
Moreover, depending on state law and the priority provisions in the
HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, the HOA may not be entitled to priority payments and may find itself last in a long line of secured
creditors. For example, Florida statute Section 720.3085 states that a lien to
secure payment of HOA assessments shall relate back to the date on which
the original declaration of the community was recorded.114 Therefore, as to
all creditors besides first mortgagees, a secured interest formed after the HOA
recorded its original declaration will be subordinate to the HOA’s interest
unless federal or state law sets forth otherwise. However, not all states provide such lien status. California law, for example, states that an HOA lien
shall be prior to all other liens recorded subsequent to the notice of delinquent
assessment.115 This means that an HOA lien is subject to the standard priority
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See In re Canning, 706 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2013).
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11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2017).

114

FLA. STAT. § 720.3085 (2015).
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rule that liens are prioritized by the date they are filed rather than the date the
HOA executed its declaration.116
Considering the above factors, section 523(a)(16) does not offer necessary protection for the HOA as much as it creates a nuisance for the debtor
homeowner. In reality, section 523(a)(16) is more of a windfall for HOAs
than a necessary provision to ensure recovery of default assessments. Any
well counseled HOA would know that, in most circumstances, engaging in
time consuming litigation against an insolvent debtor is far less efficient than
placing a lien on the property and foreclosing on it. Depending on the HOAs
priority in relation to the first mortgage, the latter course of action would
allow the HOA to sell or at least rent the property after it retakes it in foreclosure.117 However, section 523(a)(16) exposes the debtor to potential action
that would allow the HOA to sue a homeowner, who is not in possession of
the property, and then garnish that homeowner’s wages or bank accounts,
even if the association additionally pursues lien foreclosure.118
Amending section 523(a)(16) will thus tailor an HOA’s available recourse without impeding on its ability to recover lost payment. It is important
that the law encourages HOAs to explore alternative and more efficient
courses to payment, which will also eliminate reoccurring assessments
against a bankrupt debtor not in possession of the encumbered property.
The rest of this Comment will explore the available courses of action an
HOA may take to recover for its lost assessments and how section 523(a)(16)
should be amended to impose a lessor burden on debtors at as little a cost as
possible to HOAs. This will begin with an analysis of lien priority status, a
solution proffered by some legal scholars that calls for careful consideration.
1. Is lien priority the right solution?
It has been proposed that the solution to an HOA’s priority problem,
which usually subordinates an HOA lien to the first mortgage, is for HOAs
to establish lien priority within their Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions

116

See Christensen, supra note 99.
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Jonathan M. Mofsky, Important Ruling for Associations Seeking to Foreclose in Advance of
Lenders, DAILY BUS. REVIEW, http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/home/id=1202767742325/Important-Ruling-for-Lenders/ (“By filing and quickly prosecuting separate foreclosure actions based on
liens for unpaid assessments, associations have been able to acquire and rent properties embroiled in prolonged mortgage foreclosure proceedings.”).
118 Jill Mazirow Eshman, What’s A Homeowners’ Association To Do? Collecting Dues and Assessments During Difficult Financial Times, 53 ADVOC. 33, 34 (2010) (stating “[a]t the same time as the
association pursues the statutory lien foreclosure, the association may pursue a money judgment, presumably for the same limited unpaid assessments for which a statutory lien may be obtained against the nonpaying owner.”).
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(CC&Rs).119 As previously discussed, state law is one method of determining
lien priority. However, because most state statutes state that an HOA lien
shall relate back to the date it recorded its CC&R,120 the HOA has the ability
to establish senior priority through its CC&R even as to a first mortgage.121
This means that the HOA could foreclose with the same rights that a bank
would normally have and sell the property retaining all of the proceeds.
HOA lien priority certainly seems to be an appealing mechanism for
offering HOAs better protection and the ability to find due-paying buyers that
will relieve both the HOA and the previous debtor. However, this solution
does not come without its drawbacks. For example, trumping the lender’s
lien will lead to lender’s charging higher rates or refusing to lend at all to
prospective buyers of property within the HOA community.122 Not only
would this make it more difficult for the HOA to find due-paying buyers, it
would also affect the HOAs property owners who would have more difficulty
selling their property.123 For these reasons CC&Rs will often contain a provision that any HOA lien is subordinate to a first mortgage.
Although an HOA may have strong fiscal reasons to subordinate its lien,
the fact that most states permit HOAs to protect themselves through senior
lien priority raises the question of whether HOAs are truly in need of section
523(a)(16) as amended. Furthermore, even without priority lien status, an
HOA still has sufficient recourse as a junior lien holder to weigh against its
case for keeping the discharge exception as is. With that said, the point of
this Comment is not to accuse section 523(a)(16) of offering HOAs too much
protection that should be curtailed to maintain bankruptcy policy. Instead, the
Comment seeks to strike a better balance between the complex rights of the
pertinent parties to this important property issue. The following two sections
describe potential mechanisms that state and federal law could strive to promote in order to lay the groundwork for amending section 523(a)(16) as later
proposed.
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Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1431.
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MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, https://www.mba.org/issues/residential-issues/hoa-super-lien-priority [hereinafter Mortgage Bankers Association] (last visited March 25, 2017).
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2. Super liens
The financial struggles of homeowner and condominium associations
prompted calls to strengthen the associations’ power to collect delinquent assessments.124 This led to many states enacting what are known as “super-lien
statutes” to elevate an association’s lien to a limited senior priority over the
first mortgage.125 The majority of states mirror their statutory language to the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (“UCIOA”) and the Uniform Condominium Act (“UCA”), which provide for a common assessment superlien.126 The Uniform Acts provide that an association’s lien will receive seniority for six months’ worth of delinquent assessments based on the association’s periodic budget.127 This creates a split priority in relation to the first
mortgage, which differentiates super liens from the priority liens discussed
in the previous section. In his Annual Review of Banking Law, Grahame
Wells states that “[b]y giving the condo association a limited priority over
the first mortgagee, the super-lien statute divides the burden of collecting
long-term delinquent condo fees between the lenders and condo associations.”128 These same principles can apply to the various associations listed
in section 523(a)(16).
States planning to enact super-lien statutes will have to consider the redeemability of the super-lien. Redeemability refers to whether the HOA will
receive a one-time senior priority, or if the HOA can regain senior priority
over all future assessment delinquencies. As Wells clarifies:
With a redeemable super-priority lien, the condo association receives a
one-time senior priority for delinquent fees; once the first mortgagee pays off
this senior portion, the condo association cannot return to the senior position.
With a redeemable super-priority lien, the first mortgagee could, by redeeming only the priority portion of the lien upon default, receive priority over all
future assessment delinquencies. The lender regains senior priority even if
the amount it pays to the condo association does not discharge the entire assessment delinquency. Conversely, under a non-redeemable super-priority
lien, the first mortgagee can return to senior priority only after redeeming the
entire delinquent assessment. For instance, if the unit owner was in default
for nine months of assessments, six months would be senior to the mortgage

124 Grahame K. Wells, The Use of Super-Liens to Promote Cooperation Between Condominium
Associations and Lenders, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 477, 478 (1994).
125 Id. at 484 (“Legislatures in Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia have enacted condominium
statutes that include a super-lien provision.”).
126

Id.

127

Id. at 490.

128

Id. at 489.
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and three months junior. If the lender paid off the six months of assessments,
the remaining three months of delinquencies would then receive the senior
priority. Even if the lender paid the entire nine months of delinquent fees to
the condo association, future condo fee deficiencies would still receive senior
priority over the first mortgage.129
Based on the existing super-lien statutes, two models are suggested: the
Massachusetts model and the Uniform model.130 The Massachusetts model
varies from the Uniform model’s non-redeemable approach by allowing the
lenders to extinguish the senior priority portion of the lien by paying off the
six months of delinquent fees. Additionally, the Massachusetts model calls
for attorneys’ fees and a notice requirement, neither of which are included in
the Uniform model.
Wells argues that inclusion of attorneys’ fees will encourage lenders to
cure the deficiency quickly, before an association has spent money trying to
collect the assessment. 131 Without such attorneys’ fee provisions it is likely
that an HOA would not receive a refund from the lender until the lender forecloses. Moreover, the notice provision requires HOAs to keep lenders aware
of non-payments, prompting better communication between HOAs and lenders. Finally, allowing lenders to redeem their senior priority will make it easier for lenders to adequately secure HOA loans and will incentivize lenders
to compensate HOAs more quickly.
3. HOA foreclosure with junior lien status
However, some believe that super liens lead to the same concerns that
priority liens do in terms of increasing the risk of originating and servicing
loans in HOA communities.132 The good news is, even with junior lien status,
HOAs are not powerless to collect their assessments. At least some appellate
courts have recognized an HOA’s right to foreclose on delinquent assessment
liens even during a lender foreclosure where the lender filed a lis pendens.133
In Florida, a recent ruling by the Fourth District Court of Appeal confirmed this.134 The case involved a prolonged mortgage foreclosure action
against the homeowner, which began in 2007.135 The first mortgagee filed a
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Id. at 492.
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Id. at 497.

132

Mortgage Bankers Association, supra note 123.
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See Jallali v. Knightsbridge Vill. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 211 So. 3d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2017).
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notice of lis pendens, in conjunction with its foreclosure action.136 A lis pendens serves two main purposes: (1) to give notice to and thereby protect any
future purchases or encumbrances of the property; and (2) to protect the
plaintiff from intervening liens.137 Subsequently, the HOA recorded a lien for
delinquent assessments against the homeowner and commenced its own foreclosure proceedings in 2012.138 The court found that a homeowner association’s declaration of covenants, recorded not only prior to the filing of a notice of lis pendens by the first mortgagee may constitute a prior recorded
interest within the meaning of the lis pendens statute. The court’s reasoning
was that a HOA’s CC&R constitutes an “interest” in property under section
48.23(1)(d) of Florida Statutes.139 The court then clearly states, “the filing of
a lis pendens does not automatically preclude an association from foreclosing
on a lien imposed under the declaration against parties other than a first mortgagee, although the association’s foreclosure may be subordinate to the foreclosure of a first mortgage.”140
The real advantage is that once the HOA forecloses it can retake the
property and collect rent on it. Although the lender’s lien will remain on the
property, the HOA would not be obliged to pay it since the parties are not in
privity of contract.141 Naturally, the bank will want to avoid losing the property and may pay out the lien in order to avoid foreclosure. Even if the bank
does not redeem the property, taking ownership away from the lender without
obligation to pay the mortgage would force the lender’s hand into foreclosure
in order to collect on its own lien. In the meantime, the HOA might rent out
the home on a short-term basis until the first mortgage holder’s foreclosure
is complete . In doing so the HOA would accrue monthly income and could
keep the proceeds.142 In cases where the lender’s claim is large and the property’s value is not sufficient to induce the lender to foreclose, the HOA will
have more time to collect rent. However, if the lender decides to foreclose
right away, the HOA can still collect rent throughout the foreclosure process
until the property is sold and a due-paying buyer moves in. In either case, the
HOA is the recipient of cash flow covering the post-petition assessments,
which justifies not keeping the debtor homeowner on the hook for such debt.
One drawback to junior lien foreclosure is that, in many states, an HOA
would become subject to paying maintenance, taxes, and insurance on the
136
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property.143 Often, HOA’s are reluctant to take such responsibility at the risk
that the superior lien holder forecloses before the property can be leased long
enough to cover the foreclosure costs. However, these concerns do not apply
in the case of a bankrupt homeowner. When an HOA forecloses against an
insolvent homeowner, the HOA would prefer a quick foreclosure process that
places a new due-paying member on the property. However, in the event of
a delayed foreclosure, the HOA can take comfort in its ability to collect rent
until a new member purchases the home from the bank.144 Meanwhile, the
bankrupt homeowner is relieved from its assessment obligations and can enjoy a fresh start.
4. Changes required in state law to facilitate efficient assessment
lien foreclosure
Because this Comment urges an amendment to the federal Bankruptcy
Code, rationalized upon the view that assessment lien foreclosure offers
HOAs a sufficient course to payment, the Comment must also urge uniformity across state laws that will allow all HOAs to recover equally. This is
currently not the case because the foreclosure process varies from state to
state. Therefore, HOAs in one state may be entitled to quick and inexpensive
foreclosure proceedings, while an HOA in another state may incur attorneys’
fees that exceed the amount of default assessments.
Admittedly, one problem with suggesting foreclosure as a mechanism
for recovering default assessments is that the foreclosure process can be quite
expensive, especially if judicial foreclosure is required under state law. For
example, Florida and nineteen other states require judicial foreclosure.145
This process was illustrated in the above-captioned case, Jallali, where the
association had to bring an action against the property owner in order to foreclose on its assessment lien.146 Judicial foreclosure requires the creditor to
file a lawsuit in state court and typically takes several months, or even years
to complete.147
143 Gerri Detweiler, Property Taxes After Foreclosure: Who Pays?, AOL (August 7, 2013, 2:00
PM),
https://www.aol.com/article/2013/08/07/property-taxes-after-foreclosure-who-pays/20689156/
(“The liability follows the property, not the owner.”).
144 Collecting HOA Assessments from Banks, HOALEADER, https://www.hoaleader.com/public/Collecting-HOA-Assessments-from-Banks-Discussion-Forum-Followup.cfm (last visited March 25,
2017) (“[T]he HOA forecloses on its lien, rents out the home, and keeps the proceeds in a separate account.”).
145 Foreclosure Laws and Procedures By State, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/realestate-guides/foreclosure-laws/ (last visited March 25, 2017).
146
147
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In order to judicially foreclose an assessment lien, an HOA must file a
lawsuit against the delinquent homeowner and obtain a judgment against
such homeowner that: (1) establishes the amount owed to the HOA; and (2)
orders the HOA’s assessment lien be foreclosed on such homeowner’s property to satisfy the amount awarded to the HOA that is found to be secured by
its assessment lien.148 This is a very timely and costly process.149 A lawsuit,
if contested, can take more than a year to go to trial, notwithstanding a possible appeal.150 Therefore, the attorneys’ fees incurred can be significant.
Even if the court awards to the HOA all of the attorneys’ fees, it is possible
that the foreclosure proceeds cover the added fees.151
Although a judicial foreclosure offers the advantage of being able to
create a “judgment lien,” this type of lien is not worth much to an HOA foreclosing against an insolvent debtor. Therefore, non-judicial foreclosure may
be a more attractive option in the type of situation discussed in this Comment.
Non-judicial foreclosure is faster and less expensive than its judicial counterpart. In a non-judicial foreclosure the HOA or appointed trustee would first
provide notice of default with a limited time to cure.152 Upon failure to cure,
a foreclosure sale will be set and the HOA or trustee will commence to prepare a notice of sale.153 The notice of sale gives the date, time, and location
of the foreclosure sale and is typically recorded in county records, mailed to
the homeowner, and published in newspapers.154 It is at the actual foreclosure
sale where the property may revert back to the foreclosing party if not sold
to a third-party. 155 The disadvantage of conducting a non-judicial foreclosure
is that it may possibly subject the HOA to a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit if
not properly conducted.156 However, if properly conducted the non-judicial
foreclosure can save the HOA a lot of time and money.
The majority of states allow lenders to choose between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.157 However, this is not the case for the
nearly twenty states that require judicial foreclosure. Therefore, the minority
of states should consider adopting a non-judicial foreclosure option for

148 GREGORY S. CAGLE, HOA ASSESSMENT LIENS 13 (2010), https://ssjmlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/2010-Advanced-Real-Estate-Law-Article-HOA-Assessment-Lien-Foreclosure.pdf
149
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HOAs, including condominium associations, and any other entity that may
be affected by an amendment to section 523(a)(16). This means that legislation pertaining to the HOA foreclosure process shall authorize HOAs to foreclose their assessment liens by non-judicial foreclosure if expressly authorized to do so by their CC&R or by state law.
C. Justifying an Amendment to Section 523(a)(16)
At this point, the Comment has described, in depth, some of the false
assumptions that the 2005 amendment to section 523(a)(16) were based on.
One assumption proven false is that the foreclosure process is not often delayed. Statistics reveal that lender foreclosures can take years,158 and are often
intentionally delayed by lenders lying in wait for an increase in property values.159 Another assumption challenged throughout is that protecting an
HOA’s interests requires keeping the debtor on the hook for post-petition assessments. However, the Comment has so far explored a number of ways an
HOA may prioritize its lien and recover losses without pursuing legal action
against an insolvent debtor. Now the Comment must address its proposed
amendment for section 523(a)(16) of the federal Bankruptcy Code.
The first goal of the amendment must be to incentivize lenders to
promptly foreclose or take possession rather than indefinitely remaining idle
while the debtor or HOA bear expenses that directly inure to the lender’s
benefit. Presently, section 523(a)(16) imposes accruing debt solely upon the
debtor without considering how to leverage the interests of other parties with
rights in the property to better serve bankruptcy’s “fresh start” policy. In regards to this inequitable benefit one court states:
The bank is the unintended beneficiary of the perfect storm of natural
disaster and this legislative inequity. While the HOA fees continue to accrue
against the debtor the bank is de-incentivized to take any action. The economics of the situation allow the bank to sit idle and not foreclose as long as
the debtor, not the bank is liable for the HOA fees. As both [the association]
and the Bank admitted the Bank receives the benefit of the HOA services
such as landscaping improvements, common area maintenance, signage, and
security. Meanwhile the debtor who does not even live in the flooded condominium and has tried valiantly to handle her financial crises caused by the
flood receives minimal if any benefit for fees she must pay.160
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See Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timelines, supra note 4.
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Adams, supra note 7, at 349 (“‘With the real estate collapse, lenders, who otherwise have the
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The first step to incentivizing lenders to promptly foreclose is to amend
section 523(a)(16). The 1994 version aimed to prevent freeriding members
but left HOAs to otherwise pick up the slack. The 2005 version aimed to
better protect creditors but instead created freeriding lenders and did not accomplish what it intended to in terms of securing payment for HOAs. Therefore, there has not yet been a version of this section that has struck an equitable balance between the debtor-member’s right to a fresh start, the HOA’s
right to payment of its assessments and fees, and the lender’s right to wait for
an advantageous market.
Of course, the reality is that simply allowing full discharge of a homeowner’s HOA debts will not serve HOAs well. Ideally, completely discharging the debtor’s HOA fees and assessments would incentivize lenders to
promptly foreclose or take possession to ensure that the HOA receives what
it needs to maintain the property so the lender can optimize its return. However, in practice, lenders receive the benefit of HOA expenditures without
assuming any collection costs. Regardless of delinquent payments and foreclosure proceedings, HOAs continue to expend funds to upkeep the property’s value, which increases the value of the property in a foreclosure sale.161
Ultimately, lenders are not legally responsible for dues owed by their borrowers and often refuse to refund any of these costs from its proceeds in a
foreclosure sale, compounding the inequity.162 However, as discussed, the
emergence of state super-lien statutes will help restore equity between HOAs
and lenders, reducing the need to enforce delinquent fees against the debtor
homeowner to a point that justifies an amendment to section 523(a)(16).
D. Proposed Amendment to Section 523(a)(16)
Some would argue that section 523(a)(16) should be completely removed from the Code’s discharge exceptions.163 The premise behind this argument is that Congress is substantially expanding discharge exceptions to
include debts where no culpable conduct is required, and where compelling
public policy concerns are not apparent.164 Pertaining to section 523(a)(16)
these critics suggest that expansion of nondischargeability to include HOA
fees, absent the showing of wrongful conduct, is a major change in bankruptcy policy to benefit a special interest group that will erode the bankruptcy’s “fresh start” policy.165

161

Wells, supra note 124, at 478.

162

Id.

163

Miles, supra note 9, at 804.

164

Id. at 803.

165

Id. at 803 n.42.

Bad Rules Won’t Clean Dirty Pools

2018]

189

Although it is true that simply not paying a creditor does not rise to the
level of misconduct that the Code originally set out to except from discharge,
being a freeriding member at the expense of other HOA members might. This
is to say that there are strong policy reasons for allowing some aspects of
section 523(a)(16) to remain part of the Code. For example, beyond offering
protection to HOAs, section 523(a)(16) also exists to protect members of the
HOA community and their property values. Allowing an individual to benefit
from personal and communal property without paying his or her personal
dues is not something that the association, or its members, should have to
tolerate, and this is what the 1994 provision sought to prevent. Therefore,
section 523(a)(16) should exist only to prevent the freeriding member and
should not apply to those who do not continue to possess or financially benefit from the property after bankruptcy.
This Comment’s proposed provision would read similarly to the 1994
provision in all aspects except for the addition of language clarifying that
homeowners associations are included within the exception. Here is the
amendment as proposed:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt . . . for a fee or assessment that becomes due
and payable after the order for relief to a membership association with respect to the debtor’s interest in a dwelling unit
that has condominium ownership, in a share of a cooperative
housing corporation, or a lot in a homeowner’s association,
but only if such fee or assessment is payable for a period
during which—
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the
condominium or cooperative project; or
(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and
received payments from the tenant for such period, but
nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the
debt of a debtor for a membership association fee or
pending or subsequent bankruptcy case.166
The purpose of this proposal is to relieve the burden of accruing assessments from non freeriding members while keeping debtors who continue to
use their property for personal use or for generating rental income responsible
for assessments coming due after filing.167

166
167

Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1994), with 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2017).
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Considering the purpose of section 523 discharge exceptions, which is
to hold debtors responsible for their debts pertaining to personal misconduct
or an important policy issue, Congress should be able to articulate, with specificity, which category the discharge exception pertains to and why. Although
protecting the interests of HOAs is important, Congress may find itself bending to the demands of every group of creditors if it is not careful to draw a
line between public policy and creditor protection. In this case, public policy
should not tolerate freeriding members. However, burdening non-freeriding
debtors to the extent section 523(a)(16) does, solely pertains to creditor protection. Certain creditors may be entitled to additional protection, but in light
of bankruptcy policy, this should not be liberally granted.168 Because an HOA
has the ability to prioritize its lien, foreclose on its assessments, and collect
rent on the property, there simply is not a compelling justification for extending protection beyond what is required to serve the policy interests.
E. The Surviving Lien
A discharge in bankruptcy extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a
claim—namely, an action against the debtor in personam—while leaving intact another—namely, an action against the debtor in rem.169 This means that
any assessment lien placed on the homeowner’s property prior to the owner’s
subsequent bankruptcy will survive the bankruptcy and not alter the HOA’s
in rem rights. It also means that a lien can be placed on the property even if
an in personam claim against the debtor is discharged through bankruptcy.
The Code’s treatment of liens further suggests that section 523(a)(16)
does not strike a fair balance between protecting creditor’s rights while
providing the debtor a fresh start. Essentially, section 523(a)(16) proffers the
creditor two causes of action, allowing both causes their full force and effect.
Therefore, the proposed amendment stands to better balance the dual purposes of bankruptcy by allowing creditors to keep both rights of action
against freeriding members and discharging an in personam action against a
non-freeriding debtor. Even those who argue that bankruptcy discourages
people from paying their debts and should be limited to those in extreme

168 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that the purpose of the bankruptcy
code is to provide the honest debtor a fresh start, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt).
169 See City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174, 177 (1919) (“Section 67 d . . . declares that liens
given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this act, shall not be affected
by it.”); see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991).
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difficulty,170 would likely conclude that a debtor forced to abandon its home
has fallen upon extremely difficult times.
However, the adage that “liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected”
may not always be reliable.171 Section 1141(c) of the Code states:
Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this
section and except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the
order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the
property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims
and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor.172
The Seventh Circuit determined that unless the lien is expressly preserved by the terms of the Plan of Reorganization the lien is voided by the
confirmation of that Plan.173 The court limited the decision to situations
where the secured creditor “participates in the reorganization,” otherwise section 1141(c) would not apply.174 Moreover, the holding of In re Penrod is
expressly limited to situations where a secured creditor has participated in a
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, and the plan does not specifically provide
for the preservation of the creditor’s lien.175 However, let this serve as a warning to HOAs participating in a debtor’s Chapter 11 plan. Although Chapter
11 cases are normally filed by businesses rather than individuals, an individual debtor may still choose to reorganize its debts in an effort to restructure
its finances and protect its assets. Therefore, in order to retain the assessment
lien after bankruptcy, it might be necessary to expressly include the lien as
part of the debtors plan, at least according to the Seventh Circuit.
III. CONCLUSION
The take away from this Comment is that the Bankruptcy Code should
strive to balance the interests of both creditors and debtors. Presently, section
523(a)(16) tips the balance in favor of HOA creditors at the expense of
debtor-members who no longer possess the property or benefit from it. The
reason it is difficult to justify the expansion of this creditor protection is that
there are already reliable mechanisms that can be used to help HOAs receive
payment of their assessments and prompt banks to foreclose such as first

170 Beth A. Buchanan Staudenmaier, Survival of Liens: “Liens Pass Through Bankruptcy Unaffected”—Or Do They? 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445, 461 (1996).
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priority status, super-lien status, HOA assessment lien foreclosure, and the
surviving lien. However, lobbyists successfully convinced Congress that the
only way HOAs could maintain their community would be by ensuring that
someone was on the hook for the unpaid assessments and, as the legal owner
of the property, the debtor-member was the easy target. However, the decision to create this discharge exception neglected the heavy burdens that are
placed on the debtor and the paths to repayment available to HOAs.
The Comment also seeks to remind Congress, as well as those contemplating these issues, that the “fresh start” policy was not solely intended as a
gift to debtors at the expense of creditors. Although the policy enables debtors to once again become a productive member of society, and relieves them
of the hopelessness associated with the burden of excessive debt, the policy
also serves economic purposes. A fresh start reduces the administrative costs
of bankruptcy by incentivizing the debtor to cooperate in the debtor’s distribution of assets. Furthermore, the fresh start encourages economic activity
by shifting resources to their most productive use and by eliminating some
of the risks of business failure.
Therefore, Congress should revert section 523(a)(16) to its original form
and include homeowners associations in the list of creditors to avoid the same
confusion that resulted in 1994. Congress must recognize that super-lien status and HOA assessment lien foreclosure are better methods of collecting
payment for default assessments than relying on an insolvent debtor to make
these payments. Because these mechanisms exist, section 523(a)(16) offers
excessive creditor protection that should be curtailed. Under the proposed
approach, the non-freeriding debtor would be freed from accumulating HOA
debt, the HOA would receive a due paying member or tenant quicker, and
lenders would retain their priority lien status.
Even if Congress chooses not to support super liens, an HOAs ability
to foreclose on its lien and hold title until the first lien holder forecloses is a
boon for the HOA. Possessory rights will allow the HOA to receive rent on
the property in the short-term while the lender goes through its own foreclosure process. If the lender has ownership rights but does not take possession
of the property, the lender may choose to redeem the property during the
HOA foreclosure. In this case the lender would have to pay whatever is owed
to the association. Therefore, regardless of how the lender decides to act, the
HOA has the ability to produce income on the property to cover, and perhaps
exceed, the debtor-members default assessments. Because of the surviving
lien, the HOA need not be concerned that their in rem rights will be extinguished along with the debtors prepetition debt. Thus, an HOA lien foreclosure covers both prepetition and post-petition assessments, allowing the HOA
to cover all loss.
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Ultimately, these mechanisms question the logic of leaving a debtor
homeowner on the hook for accumulating assessments for as long as it takes
their mortgagee to foreclose, which often takes years. Excepting these debts
from discharge would be squarely aligned with Bankruptcy’s fresh start policy and would better balances the goals of bankruptcy: creditor protection
and a fresh start for debtors.

